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This policy brief summarises the main findings and lessons learned from research on corruption, social norms 
and behaviours in Tanzania. While the findings show that petty corruption is prevalent and results in inequitable 
public service delivery, they also inform that citizen and public officials’ attitudes and behaviours towards 
corruption are shifting as a result of changes in the political environment. The evidence furthermore suggests 
that the effectiveness of conventional anti-corruption approaches may be enhanced by incorporating behavioural 
insights about entrenched social norms and collective understandings that are associated with practices of 
bribery and favouritism. 
 
Introduction 
High levels of corruption have persisted in Tanzania for a 
long time despite the presence of a robust anti-corruption 
framework. More recently though, there is an increased 
optimism that significant changes may be underway 
under the current leadership of President John Magufuli. 
However, transforming the governance system from one 
in which corruption is the norm to one where it becomes 
the exception requires adopting measures that address 
the incentives and motivations of all groups whose 
behaviours have contributed to fuelling corruption. This 
means that sustainable, systemic change will ultimately 
require the redefinition of entrenched habits and beliefs 
to accommodate new narratives, attitudes and practices 
that promote the control of corruption.  
Against this background, the perspective of incorporating 
behavioural approaches to promote anti-corruption 
outcomes has generated great interest. What 
distinguishes a behavioural perspective from conventional 
anti-corruption prescriptions is the recognition that 
people often do not make “rational” cost-benefit 
decisions but are significantly influenced by social, 
cultural or other quasi-rational factors.  
Behavioural insights could increase the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption interventions by taking into account the 
 
way in which those “non-rational” factors influence the 
propensity of individuals to engage in corruption. For 
instance, perceptions of the close environment as highly 
corrupt may cue people into making semi-automated 
corrupt decisions. Alternatively, expectations grounded in 
social norms and collective ways of thinking may promote 
the social acceptability of certain corrupt behaviours. 
Against this backdrop, the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) through its East Africa 
Research Fund (EARF) commissioned the Basel Institute 
on Governance to conduct qualitative research exploring 
the utility of behavioural approaches to address petty 
corruption, which in Tanzania was conducted in 
collaboration with researchers from the University of Dar 
es Salaam. This policy brief extracts the main research 
findings and policy lessons learned for the case of 
Tanzania as one of three East African countries under 
investigation.1  
Main Research Findings 
The research reveals strong evidence that behavioural 
drivers play a significant role in fuelling and perpetuating 
practices associated with petty corruption (such as 
bribery, gift-giving and favouritism) during the provision of 
public services. In particular, high levels of petty 
corruption in the Tanzanian health sector are associated 
                                                      
1 The other countries were Rwanda and Uganda. For more detail, consult the comparative 
and country reports as well as the other two policy briefs associated to the project, 
accessible on www.baselgovernance.org/publications/. 
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with an informal system of social norms and beliefs that 
privilege personal relationships and the ability to pay a 
bribe.  
The research reveals that the experience of most users of 
public health services is that accessibility is not 
straightforward; formal rights and entitlements are not 
adequately enforced and citizens must pragmatically 
resort to informal social connections or bribing as a way 
of expediting treatment. 
Social networks emerge in the research as central 
mechanisms that motivate and perpetuate behaviours 
linked to corruption. Informal social networks start with 
family and close friends, but can extend to all forms of 
acquaintances and instrumentally include important 
individuals or ‘useful connections’ that can lend a hand in 
times of need. They are extremely valued resources 
because they provide mutual assistance and help solve 
problems. In fact, the evidence suggests that social 
networks in Tanzania have the function of a currency, in 
that a broad network grants power and respectability and 
people ‘invest’ in their networks with the expectation of 
accruing benefits at a later stage.  
Social networks are effective because they operate on 
the basis of widely recognised social norms prescribing 
that individuals have an obligation to share resources and 
wealth with their group and a duty to reciprocate favours 
and gifts received. Those social norms seamlessly 
penetrate the public sphere, which is why the dynamics of 
the social networks are associated with favouritism and 
even embezzlement on the part of service providers, who 
are expected to use their positions to benefit their 
families and friends. Furthermore, gift-giving and bribing 
are used instrumentally to co-opt service providers into 
one’s network. Under such circumstances, bribes are not 
dispensed as one-off transactions but rather as part of an 
on-going exchange in an economy of favours that explains 
why petty corruption has reached systemic levels. 
The findings illuminate the tensions generated by the 
coexistence of multiple normative frameworks. On the 
one hand, citizens ascribe great value to social norms of 
solidarity and reciprocity, not only because they are 
effective in solving problems and lending assistance, but 
also because they are associated with social status, 
respect and reputation, all of which in turn reinforces the 
social acceptability of corruption. On the other hand, the 
formal laws are often regarded as intrinsically unfair, and 
because legal rights and entitlements are rarely realised, 
formal rules and procedures are dismissed as little more 
than an obstacle to the pursuit of more important goals.  
Against this backdrop, there is mounting evidence that 
the tightening of law enforcement under the current 
administration is exacerbating tensions between the 
informal social and formal legal norms, as service 
providers find it increasingly difficult to utilise their public 
positions in favour of their networks. 
 
Other behavioural drivers of petty corruption relate to 
stereotypes or default assumptions (narrow frames) about 
high corruption as being the normal state of affairs and 
inevitable. Citizens also share collective images (mental 
models) about the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption 
institutions, which reinforce the idea that impunity is the 
norm.  
However, the research findings indicate increasing levels 
of trust in national and local governments. This may 
suggest that collective images may be changing in a way 
that it is possible to view the state as an agent of positive 
change.   
 
 
Policy Recommendations 
On the basis of the research findings, the following four 
recommendations highlight the relevance of applying 
behavioural insights for practitioners:  
Testing behavioural approaches to anti-corruption. 
Developing interventions based on the evidence 
concerning behavioural drivers of corruption is a 
promising avenue for complementing conventional anti-
corruption approaches. Such behavioural interventions 
Box 1: Turning tides: ‘the Magufuli effect’ 
•  President Magufuli seems to have struck a cord with Tanzanian 
citizens by espousing virtues of integrity as evidenced by the social 
media frenzy that followed the first austerity measures asking ‘what 
would Magufuli do?’  
• Citizen support for the President is linked to expectations of meaningful 
changes and improved livelihoods, which if realised, could potentially 
limit the instrumental role fulfilled by the social network. 
• Conversely, public service providers are responding to this shrinking 
space for corrupt behaviours creatively, for instance, by simply stating 
‘Magufuli’ as a code word to communicate to their networks that it is 
no longer possible to grant favours or divert resources to favour 
particularistic interests.  
Box 2: Behavioural drivers of petty corruption in Tanzania 
• In a context of deficient public service delivery, social networks fulfil a 
crucial functional role by providing an informal safety net for citizens. 
Values of solidarity and reciprocity pragmatically translate into 
practices of favouritism and bribery (often camouflaged as gift-giving) 
thereby providing citizens with access to public services.  
• Citizens default to narrow frames confirming that practices of petty 
corruption are the normal state of affairs and corrupt practices are 
justified with the understanding that everyone engages in them.  
• Mental models further reinforce the perception that anti-corruption and 
enforcement agencies are weak, suggesting that impunity is the norm.  
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should be conceived to target and even harness the local 
context and understandings - including social norms and 
collective beliefs - which shape incentives, attitudes and 
expectations regarding corruption. Designing anti-
corruption behavioural interventions involves identifying 
shifts (or nudges) in the environment or in the information 
that is shared with individuals that will motivate decision-
making that supports better control of corruption 
outcomes.   
It should be underscored that, although a number of 
behavioural interventions have proven effective in 
experimental settings, the practice of incorporating 
behavioural considerations into policy making to improve 
macro level socio economic outcomes is still very much in 
a nascent stage. There are no blueprints to predicting 
what nudges people will respond to and in what way, 
which means that a) behavioural interventions should be 
rigorously piloted and assessed and b) practitioners 
should be ready to experiment and test different 
approaches to find those most effective in bringing about 
social change in a given context.  
 
Unleashing the power of social networks 
Although social networks have been identified as fuelling 
and perpetuating practices of petty corruption, there is 
evidence that they can also be harnessed to promote 
better anti-corruption outcomes.  Social network analysis 
strongly suggests the potential of social networks as 
effective mechanisms for spreading ideas and diffusing 
behavioural change. This can happen, for instance, by 
means of an induction or “peer effect” whereby an 
individual’s chances of adopting certain behaviours 
increase if the person has a friend or relative who has 
adopted the behaviours in question. Thus, social networks 
are key to the spread of ideas and, importantly, to shifting 
social norms. 
Network-driven interventions would harness the 
confirmed pressures that tending to the expectations and 
norms of social networks exert on individuals. Such 
interventions could enlist individuals in a position of 
influence (or centrality) in their respective networks to act 
as anti-corruption champions; promoting ideas and 
changes in behaviours to break with entrenched practices 
linked to corruption and setting new anti-corruption 
trends and values. 
 
Promoting changes to the popular culture of corruption.  
Challenging the conventional wisdom on the prevalence 
of corruption is key, particularly, regarding beliefs that 
corruption is inevitable. In this regard, the evidence 
suggests that the current context is ripe in Tanzania to 
launch initiatives to promote a shift in expectations in 
light of President Magufuli’s actions, policies and 
discourse that directly confront those stereotypes. 
Concretely, dissemination of strong and carefully tailored 
messages may act as a catalyst to trigger changes in 
public attitudes instilling an expectation that corruption 
can indeed be curbed.  
In this regard, there is growing evidence that 
“edutainment” campaigns can be effective at 
disseminating messages aimed at shifting mental models 
and entrenched practices.  
Creative storylines could emphasise the hidden social 
costs of corruption as well as the hardships families must 
confront when a wage earner is convicted of a crime of 
corruption. Moreover, edutainment messages could 
reinforce the notion that citizens are entitled to receive 
public services in contrast to prevalent understandings 
that receiving a service necessitates the exchange of gifts 
or favours.  
 
Developing sector-specific approaches.   
Public service providers are confronted with conflicting 
pressures from social networks that often contradict their 
public duties. This often involves the actions of managers 
and colleagues that induce individual service providers to 
tolerate and even actively engage in corrupt behaviours. 
Therefore, reforming work environments should be an 
important target area for reinforcing macro-level priming 
about the commitment to enforce a zero tolerance to 
corruption and an anti-corruption culture.  
Increasing transparency in public service delivery may 
further help to reduce opportunities for informal 
arrangements between service providers and users. One 
 
The Basel Institute on Governance is an Associated Institute of the 
University of Basel. 
• Develop and rigorously test pilot behavioural interventions that 
apply different nudges to elicit decision making that breaks habits 
of corruption.  
• Harnessing the transformative power of social networks can be 
pursued by identifying and engaging influential individuals in 
social networks to disseminate key messages and promote 
behavioural change. 
• Develop “edutainment” interventions aimed at challenging 
preconceptions and stereotypes about corruption and reinforcing 
positive stereotypes, for example promoting integrity as the new 
normal. 
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In collaboration with 
the University of Dar 
es Salaam 
such approach is the introduction of digitised queue 
management systems, which has shown success in 
decreasing favouritism in health service provision in 
Rwanda.  
Equally important would be to creatively develop positive 
incentives – awards, bonuses and recognitions - that 
explicitly reward honesty while reinforcing the credibility 
of sanctions in order to shift the expectations of the 
social networks. Citizen scorecards and similar 
instruments could provide useful inputs to operationalise 
such concepts as well as public ‘naming and shaming’ of 
individuals proven guilty of corrupt offences.  
!
!
!
This document is an output from a project funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) through the 
Research for Evidence Division (RED) for the benefit of 
developing countries. However, the views expressed and 
information contained in it are not necessarily those of or 
endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such 
views or information or for any reliance placed on them. 
The Basel Institute on Governance is an Associated Institute of the 
University of Basel. 
• Introducing positive incentive schemes to tangibly reward honest
behaviour while increasing the social costs of malfeasance can
motivate social networks to ensure that service providers act with
integrity. 
Lessons for Practitioners 
• In a context in which formal rights and entitlements are not adequately
enforced, citizens pragmatically resort to their informal social network
as an effective means to obtain a ‘simplified’ service delivery. Bottom
up interventions can only go so far without improvement in the quality
and accessibility of public services.
• Practices of bribery and favouritism result in a regressive public service
as the most vulnerable in society often lack the appropriate social
relations or resources to elicit favours and bribe. Such hidden costs of
corruption should be explicitly exposed.
• The high allegiance to social networks and the values of solidarity and
reciprocity they espouse could be creatively harnessed for favourable
anti-corruption outcomes.
• While social norms and mental models are entrenched, they are not
immutable and can change on the basis of exposure to consistent
actions and messages by authorities.  Given the right political context,
changes in beliefs and expectations can happen in a relatively short
time period. 
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